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Abstract
This paper continues the investigation of the logic of competing theories (be they scientific, social, political etc.) initiated in [4]. 
We introduce a many-valued, multi-type modal language which we endow with relational semantics based on enriched reflexive 
graphs, inspired by Ploščica’s representation of general lattices. We axiomatize the resulting many-valued, non-distributive modal 
logic of these structures and prove a completeness theorem. We illustrate the application of this logic through a case study in which 
we model competition among interacting political promises and social demands within an arena of political parties social groups.
© 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This paper is a continuation of the investigation into competing theories started in [4]. Its technical contributions 
are rooted in the generalized Sahlqvist canonicity and correspondence for normal lattice-based logics [10,9], i.e. non-
classical propositional logics for which the distributive laws between ∧ and ∨ do not need to hold. Via algebraic and 
duality-theoretic techniques, these logics, and non-distributive normal modal logics in particular, have been endowed 
with complete relational semantics based on formal contexts [18] and reflexive graphs [3,5]. These semantic struc-
tures have a well developed theory, both algebraic and proof-theoretic [20,13,15] and model-theoretic [11], and have 
facilitated new insights on possible interpretations and use of lattice-based modal logics.
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extensions are interpreted as epistemic logics of categories and concepts, and in [8], the corresponding ‘common 
knowledge’-type construction is used to give an epistemic-logical formalization of the notion of prototype of a cate-
gory; in [6,21], formal context semantics for non-distributive modal logic is proposed as an encompassing framework 
for the integration of rough set theory [25] and formal concept analysis [18], and in this context, the basic non-
distributive modal logic is interpreted as the logic of rough concepts; via graph-based semantics, in [5], the same 
logic is interpreted as the logic of informational entropy, i.e. an inherent boundary to knowability due e.g. to per-
ceptual, theoretical, evidential or linguistic limits, and in [4], many-valued graph-based semantics is introduced for 
non-distributive normal modal logic, and its potential is explored as a formal framework for modelling competing 
theories in the empirical sciences.
Both in the crisp and in the many-valued setting, in the graphs (Z, E) on which the relational structures are based, 
the relation E is interpreted as an indiscernibility relation, which makes the present approach similar to that of approx-
imation spaces in rough set theory [25]. However, the key difference is that, rather than generating modal operators 
which associate any subset of Z with its definable E-approximations, E generates a complete lattice in which the 
distributivity laws do not need to hold. This lattice is defined as the concept lattice of the formal context (Z, Z, Ec)
arising from the graph (Z, E). In the approach proposed in [5,4] and followed in the present paper, concepts are not 
understood as definable approximations of predicates, but rather they represent ‘all there is to know’, i.e. the theoret-
ical horizon to knowability, given the inherent boundary encoded into E. Interestingly, E is required to be reflexive 
but in general neither transitive nor symmetric, which is in line with what observed in the literature in psychology 
(cf. [27,24]) and business science [17].
In this paper, we start exploring a semantic setting for non-distributive modal logics that is not only many-valued, as 
the setting of [4] is, but unlike [4] is also multi-type. The main motivation and starting point of the present contribution 
is to introduce a formal environment in which to analyse the similarities between the competition among political 
theories (both in their institutional incarnations as political parties, and in their social incarnations as social blocks or 
groups) and the competition between scientific theories as treated in [4].
In [4], scientific theories are identified with the sets of their relevant variables (e.g. mass, speed, position are 
relevant variables for gravitation theory); hypotheses formulated in the background of a given theory X establish 
connections between variables in X and are captured as formulas which can be tested (i.e. evaluated) on different 
databases (i.e. states of the domain Z of a graph-based model), with a greater or lesser degree of confidence in the 
outcome of the test (captured in the truth-value in the many-valued semantics). Since databases themselves are built 
according to a given theory (“observations are theory-laden”), the degree of confidence in the outcome of tests is 
formulated in terms of how compatible the background theory of the given hypothesis is with the theory according 
to which the given database has been built. Theories compete in the arena of databases by their key hypotheses being 
tested on different databases. Then the criteria establishing whether theory X outcompetes theory Y need to assign 
different weights to the performances of hypotheses on databases that have high compatibility with the theories to 
which each hypothesis pertains, and to the performances of the same hypotheses on databases with low compatibility. 
In the present paper, we propose the following analogies:
Scientific theories  Socio-political theories
Variables  Issues
Hypotheses  Promises / Demands
Here the “issues” could be things like distribution of wealth, access to education and progressive taxation in the 
context of e.g. a socialist theory. The main difference between the competition of scientific theories outlined above 
and that of socio-political theories is that competition among the latter plays out not on a single arena but on at least 
two arenas simultaneously: that is, political parties (incarnating socio-political theories) compete with each other by 
testing how well their promises (phrased in terms of issues) score on different social groups, while at the same time, 
social groups (also incarnating socio-political theories) compete with each other by testing how well their demands 
score on political parties. The double-sidedness of this situation calls for a multi-type formal framework, both in 
respect to the language and the models. However, there is another interesting similarity between the socio-political 
case and the scientific case: as discussed above, the fact that databases are theory-laden results in different degrees 
of confidence in the outcomes of tests of different hypotheses, depending on the degree of compatibility between 
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issues which are relevant to that social group) results in different degrees of confidence when the promises of different 
political parties are tested on different social groups, which again depends on the degree of compatibility between 
their underlying theories. Conversely and symmetrically, the fact that each political party has an underlying theory 
results in different degrees of confidence when the demands of different social groups are tested on different political 
parties, which again depends on the degree of compatibility between their underlying theories.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 collects some preliminaries on multi-type non-distributive modal 
logic and the many-valued enriched formal contexts and many-valued graphs upon which its semantics will be built. 
Section 3 introduces the notion of a many-valued heterogeneous frame – structures we will use to model sets of 
political parties and social groups and the relations among them. In Section 4 we define the formal semantics of 
our logic in terms of many-valued heterogeneous models and formulate a completeness theorem, the proof of which 
is given in Appendix A. Section 5 presents a case study in which we use a many-valued heterogeneous model to 
capture and reason about a scenario loosely inspired by the British socio-political scene. We conclude in Section 7 by 
discussing some potential applications of our work and outlining some further research directions.
2. Preliminaries
This section collects and modifies material from [5, Section 2.1], [6, Section 7.2], and [4, Section 3].
2.1. Multi-type nondistributive modal logic
Let Prop be a (countable or finite) set of proposition variables. The language LMT of the multi-type nondistributive 
modal logic has terms of types SD, PP defined as follows:
SD  σ ::= ⊥ |  | p | σ ∧ σ | σ ∨ σ | π,
PP  π ::= ⊥ |  | p | π ∧ π | π ∨ π | ♦σ,
where p ∈ Prop. Intuitively, we create two copies of the same language, one in which formulas are intended as 
social demands σ and one as political promises π . The two types are connected via heterogeneous modal operators, 
transforming social demands into political promises and vice versa. The term-algebra of this language is an example 
of heterogeneous algebra, a notion introduced by Birkhoff and Lipson [2] naturally extending notions and results from 
universal algebra to a context in which algebras have more than one domain and operations can be defined not only 
within one and the same domain, but also between different domains.
Definition 2.1. A normal heterogeneous LMT-algebra is a tuple (LS, LP , ♦, ) such that LS and LP are lattices 
(intended to interpret formulas of type SD and PP, respectively), and ♦ : LS → LP and  : LP → LS are normal 
(i.e. ⊥-preserving and ∨-preserving) modal operators.
The basic multi-type normal LMT-logic is a set L of type-uniform LMT-sequents ϕ 
 ψ (i.e. sequents with 
ϕ, ψ ∈ SD or ϕ, ψ ∈ PP), containing the following axioms:
p 
 p, ⊥ 
 p, p 
 ,
p 
 p ∨ q, q 
 p ∨ q, p ∧ q 
 p, p ∧ q 
 q,
⊥ 
 ⊥, (π1 ∨ π2) 
 π1 ∨ π2
♦⊥ 
 ⊥, ♦(σ1 ∨ σ2) 
 ♦σ1 ∨♦σ2
and closed under the following inference rules:
ϕ 









 ϕ χ 
 ψ
χ 
 ϕ ∧ ψ
ϕ 
 χ ψ 
 χ
ϕ ∨ ψ 
 χ
π1 
 π2 σ1 
 σ2π1 
 π2 ♦σ1 
 ♦σ2
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 ψ . The next proposition can be shown 
via a routine Lindenbaum Tarski argument.
Proposition 2.2. The basic logic L is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of heterogeneous LMT-algebras.
2.2. Many-valued enriched formal contexts
A formal context, as used in formal concept analysis [18], consists of a set of objects, a set of features, and a 
relation between these two sets relating objects to the features they posses. Building on the work of Bělohlávek [1], 
in this section we introduce a many-valued version of a formal context, also enriched with additional relations. These 
structures will be an essential ingredient in the semantics of our logic, which we will formally introduce in Sec-
tions 3 and 4, below. Throughout this paper, we let A = (D, 1, 0, ∨, ∧, ⊗, →) denote an arbitrary but fixed complete 
frame-distributive (finite meets distribute over arbitrary joins) and dually frame-distributive (finite joins distribute over 
arbitrary meets), commutative and associative residuated lattice (understood as the algebra of truth-values). For every 
set W , an A-valued subset (or A-subset) of W is a map u : W → A. We let AW denote the set of all A-subsets. Clearly, 
AW inherits the algebraic structure of A by defining the operations and the order pointwise. The A-subsethood relation 
between elements of AW is the map SW : AW × AW → A defined as SW(f, g) := ∧z∈W(f (z) → g(z)). For every 





When u, v : W → A and u ≤ v w.r.t. the pointwise order, we write u ⊆ v. An A-valued relation (or A-relation) is 
a map R : U × W → A. Two-valued relations can be regarded as A-relations. In particular for any set Z, we let 
Z : Z × Z → A be defined by Z(z, z′) =  if z = z′ and Z(z, z′) = ⊥ if z = z′. An A-relation R : Z × Z → A is 
reflexive if Z ⊆ R. Any A-valued relation R : U × W → A induces maps R(0)[−] : AW → AU and R(1)[−] : AU →
AW defined as follows: for every f : U → A and every u : W → A,1
R(1)[f ] : W → A
x → ∧a∈U(f (a) → R(a, x))
R(0)[u] : U → A
a → ∧x∈W(u(x) → R(a, x))
A formal A-context2 or A-polarity (cf. [1]) is a structure P = (A, X, I ) such that A and X are sets and I : A ×X →
A. Any formal A-context induces maps (·)↑ : AA → AX and (·)↓ : AX → AA given by (·)↑ = I (1)[·] and (·)↓ = I (0)[·]. 
These maps are such that, for every f ∈ AA and every u ∈ AX ,
SA(f,u
↓) = SX(u,f ↑),
that is, the pair of maps (·)↑ and (·)↓ form an A-Galois connection. In [1, Lemma 5], it is shown that every A-
Galois connection arises from some formal A-context. A formal A-concept of P is a pair (f, u) ∈ AA × AX such that 
f ↑ = u and u↓ = f . It follows immediately from this definition that if (f, u) is a formal A-concept, then f ↑↓ = f
and u↓↑ = u, that is, f and u are stable. The set of formal A-concepts can be partially ordered as follows:
1 Note that, in the two-valued case, f and u are crisp sets and R(1)[f ] is simply the set of those elements of W to which all elements of f are 
related, while R(0)[u] is the set of all elements of U which are related to all elements of u.
2 In the crisp setting, a formal context [18], or polarity, is a structure P = (A, X, I ) such that A and X are sets, and I ⊆ A × X is a binary 
relation. Every such P induces maps (·)↑ : P(A) → P(X) and (·)↓ : P(X) → P(A), respectively defined by the assignments B↑ := I (1)[B]
and Y↓ := I (0)[Y ]. A formal concept of P is a pair c = (c, ([c])) such that c ⊆ A, ([c]) ⊆ X, and c↑ = ([c]) and ([c])↓ = c. The set L(P ) of 
the formal concepts of P can be partially ordered as follows: for any c, d ∈ L(P ),
c ≤ d iff c ⊆ d iff ([d]) ⊆ ([c]).
With this order, L(P ) is a complete lattice, the concept lattice P+ of P . Any complete lattice L is isomorphic to the concept lattice P+ of some 
polarity P .
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Ordered in this way, the set of the formal A-concepts of P is a complete lattice, which we denote P+.
An enriched formal A-context (cf. [6, Section 7.2]) is a structure F = (P , R, R) such that P = (A, X, I ) is 
a formal A-context and R : A × X → A and R : X × A → A are I -compatible, i.e. R(0) [{α/x}], R(1) [{α/a}], 
R
(0) [{α/a}] and R(1) [{α/x}] are stable for every α ∈ A, a ∈ A and x ∈ X. The complex algebra of an enriched formal 
A-context F = (P , R, R) is the algebra F+ = (P+, [R], 〈R〉) where [R], 〈R〉 : P+ → P+ are defined by the 
following assignments: for every c = (c, ([c])) ∈ P+,
[R]c = (R(0) [([c])], (R(0) [([c])])↑)
〈R〉c = ((R(0) [c])↓,R(0) [c]).
Lemma 2.3. (cf. [6, Lemma 15]) If F = (X, R, R) is an enriched formal A-context, F+ = (X+, [R], 〈R〉) is 
a complete normal lattice expansion such that [R] is completely meet-preserving and 〈R〉 is completely join-
preserving.
2.3. Many-valued graphs
Graph-based models for non-distributive logics are closely connected with the topological structures used by 
Ploščica [26] to represent general lattices, see also [16,14]. In [5] these models are studied with the TiRS conditions 
of [14, Section 2] dropped, and many-valued graph-based models are introduced in [4].
A reflexive A-graph is a structure X = (Z, E) such that Z is a nonempty set and E is a reflexive A-relation, 
i.e. E : Z × Z → A and R(z, z) = A for every z ∈ Z. From now on, we will assume that all A-graphs we consider 
are reflexive even when we drop the adjective.
In what follows, for any set S we let SA := A ×S and SX := S. Any R : S ×W → A admits the following liftings3:
IR : SA × WX → A
((α, s),w) → R(s,w) → α
JR : SX × WA → A
(s, (α,w)) → R(s,w) → α
Applying these constructions to A-graphs we get:
Definition 2.4. For any reflexive A-graph X = (Z, E), the formal A-context associated with X is
PX := (ZA,ZX, IE),
where ZA := A × Z and ZX := Z, and IE : ZA × ZX → A is defined by IE((α, z), z′) = E(z, z′) → α. We let 
X+ := PX+.
For all f : A × Z → A, and u : Z → A, we let
u[0] = E[0][u] : A × Z → A
(α, z) → I (0)E [u](α, z) = u↓(α, z)
f [1] = E[1][f ] : Z → A
z → I (1)E [f ](z) = f ↑(z)
where the maps4 f ↑ : Z → A and u↓ : A × Z → A are respectively defined by the assignments
3 In the crisp case, SA consists of two copies of S, WX is simply W , and IR is a relation between these two sets which relates every element of 
the ‘1-copy’ of S to every element of W , and relates an element s of the ‘0-copy’ of S to an element w ∈ W iff R does not relate s to w.
4 We will abbreviate E[0][u] and E[1][f ] as u[0] and f [1] , respectively, for each u, f as above, and write u[01] and f [10] for (u[0])[1] and 
(f [1])[0] , respectively. Then u[0] = I (0)
E
[u] = u↓ and f [1] = I (1)
E
[f ] = f ↑, where the maps (·)↓ and (·)↑ are those associated with the polarity 
PX.
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(α,z′)∈ZA




[u(z′) → (E(z, z′) → α)].
Hence, for any z ∈ Z and α ∈ A,
E[0][u](α, z) := ∧z′∈ZX [u(z′) → (E(z, z′) → α)]
E[1][f ](z) := ∧(α,z′)∈ZA[f (α, z′) → (E(z′, z) → α)].
3. Many-valued heterogeneous frames
We will now define the many-valued relational structures upon which the semantics of LMT will be built in the 
next section. Intuitively, these structures consist of a set ZP of political parties together with an A-relation EP of 
similarity among them, together forming a reflexive A-graph XP ; a second reflexive A-graph, XS , consisting of a 
set of social groups ZS and an A-relation ES encoding similarity among them. These two reflexive A-graphs are 
then linked by two further A-relations: R♦ encodes the affinity that social groups have for political parties, while R
records the affinities in the opposite direction. The relations R♦ and R are required to satisfy certain compatibility 
conditions, the purpose of which is to ensure that the operations R[0]♦ , R
[1]
♦ , R
[0] and R[0] which are introduced below 
and upon which the semantics of the modalities ♦ and  is built, produce stable sets when applied to stable sets.
We formulate the appropriate notion of complex algebra to accompany this type of frame. As in classical modal 
logic, the carrier of the complex algebra consists of all subsets of the frame that can be legitimately assigned as 
valuations to proposition letters: in the classical case all subsets of the domain are legitimate targets of a valuation 
and hence the complex algebra is the Boolean algebra of all subsets together with operations corresponding to the 
modalities; in the present setting the complex algebra is the lattice of all stable sets together with the operations 
interpreting the modalities.
Definition 3.1. If LMT denotes the multi-type language defined in Section 2.1, a many-valued graph-based LMT-
frame (abbreviated as heterogeneous A-frame) is a structure G = (XS, XP , R, R♦) such that XS = (ZS, ES) and 
XP = (ZP , EP ) are reflexive A-graphs, and R♦ : ZS × ZP → A and R : ZP × ZS → A satisfy the following 
compatibility conditions5: for any z ∈ ZS , z′ ∈ ZP and α, β ∈ A,
(R
[0] [{β/(α, z′)}])[01] ⊆ R[0] [{β/(α, z′)}]
(R
[1] [{β/z′}])[10] ⊆ R[1] [{β/z′}]
(R
[0]
♦ [{β/(α, z)}])[01] ⊆ R[0]♦ [{β/(α, z)}]
(R
[1]
♦ [{β/z}])[10] ⊆ R[1]♦ [{β/z}],
where for all f : ZSA → A and u : ZPX → A,
R
[0] [f ] : ZPX → A
z → J (0)R [f ](z)
R
[1] [u] : ZSA → A
(α, z) → J (1)R [u](α, z),
and for all f : ZPA → A and u : ZSX → A,
5 In what follows, we drop the indices whenever a property, notion or construction applies verbatim to both domains or when disambiguation 
can be achieved with other means. For instance, symbols such as (·)[0] and (·)[1] will never occur with indices, since the type of the argument is 
enough to disambiguate them.
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[0]
♦ [f ] : ZSX → A
z → J (0)R♦ [f ](z)
R
[1]
♦ [u] : ZPA → A
(α, z) → J (1)R♦ [u](α, z).
Hence, for any z ∈ ZP , w ∈ ZS and α ∈ A,
R
[0] [f ](z) := ∧(α,z′)∈ZSA[f (α, z′) → (R(z, z′) → α)]
R
[1] [u](α,w) := ∧z′∈ZPX [u(z′) → (R(z′,w) → α)],
and for any z ∈ ZS , w ∈ ZP and α ∈ A,
R
[0]
♦ [f ](z) :=
∧
(α,z′)∈ZPA [f (α, z






′) → (R♦(z′,w) → α)].
The complex algebra of a heterogeneous A-frame G as above is the heterogeneous algebra G+ = (X+S , X+P , 〈R♦〉,
〈R〉), where X+S := P+XS and X+P := P+XP (cf. Definition 2.4), and 〈R♦〉 : X+P → X+S and 〈R〉 : X+S → X+P are 
heterogeneous operations of G+ defined as follows: for every c = (c, ([c])) ∈ X+S and d = (d, ([d])) ∈ X+P ,
〈R〉c = ((R[0] [c])[0],R[0] [c])
〈R♦〉d = ((R[0]♦ [d])[0],R[0]♦ [d]).
With a proof analogous to that of Lemma 2.3, one can readily show that
Lemma 3.2. If G = (XS, XP , R, R♦) is a heterogeneous A-frame, G+ = (X+S , X+P , 〈R♦〉, 〈R〉) is such that X+S
and X+P are complete lattices, and 〈R♦〉 and 〈R〉 are completely join-preserving.
4. Many-valued heterogeneous models
We are now finally ready to formulate the semantics of LMT. We begin by adding valuations to the frames 
introduced above in Section 3 to obtain models.
Definition 4.1. A graph-based A-model of LMT is a tuple M = (G, V ) such that G = (XS, XP , R, R♦) is a het-
erogeneous A-frame, and V : L → G+ is a homomorphism of heterogeneous algebras, i.e. V is a pair of homomor-
phisms6 VS : SD → X+P and VP : PP → X+S . For every ϕ ∈ LMT, let V (ϕ) := (ϕ, ([ϕ])), where ϕ : A × Z → A
and ([ϕ]) : Z → A, with Z being the domain of the appropriate type, are s.t. ϕ[1] = ([ϕ]) and ([ϕ])[0] = ϕ. Hence:
V (p) = (p, ([p]))
V () = (1AZA , (1AZA )[1])
V (⊥) = ((1AZX )[0],1AZX )
V (ϕ ∧ ψ) = (ϕ ∧ ψ, (ϕ ∧ ψ)[1])
V (ϕ ∨ ψ) = ((([ϕ]) ∧ ([ψ]))[0], ([ϕ]) ∧ ([ψ]))
6 Notice the inversion: formulas of type SD (social demands) are evaluated (tested) on the P -side of the model, i.e. on political parties, and 




, 〈R♦〉, 〈R〉) of the underlying frame 
of a model is a heterogeneous LMT-algebra in the sense that LP :=X+S and LS :=X+P , and moreover  := 〈R〉 :LP →LS and ♦ := 〈R♦〉 :
LS →LP .
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V (π) = ((R[0] [π])[0],R[0] [π]).
Valuations induce α-support relations between value-state pairs and formulas of the appropriate type for each α ∈ A
(in symbols: M, (β, z) α ϕ), and α-refutation relations between states of models and formulas for each α ∈ A (in 
symbols: M, z α ϕ) such that for every ϕ ∈ LMT, all z ∈ Z and all β ∈ A,
M, (β, z) α ϕ iff α ≤ ϕ(β, z),
M, z α ϕ iff α ≤ ([ϕ])(z).
This can be equivalently expressed as follows:
M, (β, z) α p iff α ≤ p(β, z);
M, (β, z) α  iff α ≤ 1AZA (β, z) i.e. always;
M, (β, z) α ⊥ iff α ≤ (1AZX )[0](β, z)
= ∧z′∈ZX [1AZX (z′) → (E(z, z′) → β)]
= ∧z′∈ZX [E(z, z′) → β]
= β;
M, (β, z) α ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, (β, z) α ϕ and M, (β, z) α ψ;
M, (β, z) α ϕ ∨ ψ iff α ≤ (([ϕ]) ∧ ([ψ]))[0](β, z)
= ∧z′∈ZX [(([ϕ]) ∧ ([ψ]))(z′) → (E(z, z′)
→ β)];
M, (β, z) α ♦σ iff α ≤ ((R[0]♦ [σ ])[0])(β, z)
= ∧z′∈ZSX [R[0]♦ [σ ](z′) → (ES(z, z′) → β)];
M, (β, z) α π iff α ≤ ((R[0] [π])[0])(β, z)
= ∧z′∈ZPX [R[0] [π](z′) → (EP (z, z′) → β)];
M, z α p iff α ≤ ([p])(z);
M, z α ⊥ iff α ≤ 1AZX (z) i.e. always;
M, z α  iff α ≤ (1AZA )[1](z)
= ∧(β,z′)∈ZA [1(β, z′) → (E(z′, z) → β)]
= ∧(β,z′)∈ZA [E(z′, z) → β]
= β;
M, z α ϕ ∨ ψ iff M, z α ϕ and M, z α ψ;
M, z α ϕ ∧ ψ iff α ≤ (ϕ ∧ ψ)[1](z)
= ∧(β,z′)∈ZA [(ϕ ∧ ψ)(β, z′) → (E(z′, z)
→ β)];
M, z α ♦σ iff α ≤ (R[0]♦ [σ ])(z)
= ∧(β,z′)∈ZPA [σ (β, z′) → (R♦(z, z′) → β)];
M, z α π iff α ≤ (R[0] [π])(z)
= ∧ ′ S [π(β, z′) → (R(z, z′) → β)].(β,z )∈ZA
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 ψ is true in a model M = (G, V ) (notation: M |= ϕ 
 ψ ) if ϕ ⊆ ψ, or 
equivalently, if ([ψ]) ⊆ ([ϕ]). A type-uniform sequent ϕ 
 ψ is valid on a graph-based frame G (notation: G |= ϕ 
 ψ ) 
if ϕ 
 ψ is true in every model M = (G, V ) based on G.
Remark 4.3. As remarked in [4], it is not difficult to see that for all stable valuations, if p ∈ Prop and β, β ′ ∈ A
such that β ≤ β ′, then p(β, z) ≤ p(β ′, z) for every z ∈ Z, and one can readily verify that this condition extends 
compositionally to every ϕ ∈ L .
The basic multi-type logic L which we introduced in Section 2.1 is complete with respect to the class of all 
graph-based A-models of LMT. The proof of the following theorem is given in Appendix A, where it is listed as 
Theorem A.8:
Theorem 4.4. The basic multi-type normal LMT-logic L is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of graph-based A-
frames.
5. Case study: the socio-political arena
Let Var be a nonempty set of variables (intended to represent topics or issues, as in e.g. [19]). As was done in [4], 
for the purpose of this analysis, a socio-political theory is characterized by (and here identified with) a certain subset 
X ⊆ Var of issues which are relevant to the given theory. The heterogeneous A-frames considered in the present section 
are structures G = (XS, XP , R, R♦) (cf. Definition 3.1) such that XS := (ZS, ES) with ZS := {zXi | 0 ≤ i ≤ n}
where Xi ⊆ Var for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n and XP := (ZP , EP ) with ZP := {zXj | 0 ≤ i ≤ m}, again with Xj ⊆ Var for each 
1 ≤ j ≤ m. The elements of the sets ZS and ZP stand for social groups and political parties, respectively. The set of 
variables indexing each social group in ZS (resp. each political party in ZP ) stand for the issues considered relevant 
by that social group or political party. Sometimes, it can be useful to encode the positive or negative orientation of the 
group/party towards each relevant issue by assigning a sign (+ or −) to each element of the indexing set Xi or Xj .7
In this context, SD-formulas (resp. PP-formulas) can be thought of as social demands (resp. political promises) which 
will be ‘tested’ (i.e. will be assigned truth-degrees) at states of ZP (resp. ZS ), i.e. at political parties (resp. social 
groups) in models based on these frames. Notice the inversion: SD-formulas will be evaluated at XP -states, and PP-
formulas at XS -states. This truth value assignment of formulas at states is then meant to act as a proxy for the support 
(or interest) of the given social group in the given political promise, and of the support (or interest) of the political 
party in the given social demand, with higher truth values indicating higher levels of support/interest.
The A-relation ES : ZS × ZS → A (resp. EP : ZP × ZP → A) encodes a graded notion of similarity between 
social groups (resp. political parties). This idea can be concretely implemented e.g. by letting E(zX1, zX2) record the 
percentage of variables of zX1 that also occur in zX2 , i.e. by taking E(zX1, zX2) = |X1 ∩ X2| ÷ |X1|, possibly modulo 
identification of similar issues.8 As remarked in [4], a relation defined accordingly will be reflexive (i.e. E(z, z) = 1
for every z ∈ Z) but does not need to be symmetric or transitive; moreover, it is not required to record the positive or 
negative attitudes vis-à-vis an issue, so as to not exclude the possibility that social groups (resp. parties) with directly 
opposing views on a large percentage of issues have a high similarity degree.
The A-relation R : ZP × ZS → A (resp. R♦ : ZS × ZP → A) encodes the extent to which a political party 
(resp. social group) has affinity with a social group (resp. political party). One would expect that such a measure should 
be based on the extent to which the political party (resp. social group) perceives its issues to be issues of the social 
group (resp. political party). This idea can be concretely implemented e.g. as follows: Let XP ⊆ Var (resp. XS ⊆ Var) 
be the set of all issues of political parties (resp. social groups). Encode the extent to which a political party zXj
7 Of course, a sign is often not enough to achieve a full disambiguation; however, for the sake of the example below, what will matter is whether 
a given party and social group assign the same or opposite sign to a given issue relevant to both.
8 In this paper, we are not actually committing to a specific definition of the similarity relations, although the one above naturally arises from the 
present formal framework and will be employed in the case study we present.
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then set R(zXj , zXi ) = ∑{f (x, y) | (x, y) ∈ Xj × Xi} ÷ |{(x, y) ∈ Xj × Xi | f (x, y) = 0}|. Recognition functions 
for social groups and the resulting definition of R♦ are analogous. More nuanced realisations might, among other 
considerations, also include a weighting to account for the relative importance of issues to the political parties or 
groups. Notice that we are not requiring, because it would be implausible, that R(zXj , zXi ) = R♦(zXi , zXj ) for all 
zXj and zXi . Below, we give a more concrete illustration of this environment by means of an example loosely inspired 
by the British socio-political scene.
Let Var := {st, o, lt, ap, f t, cr, it, f s, h, at, s} be the set of issues, where the intended meaning of each variable is 
indicated below:
st lower income tax on salaries
o foreigners out
lt lower taxes on income generated from land
ap preservation of aristocratic privileges
f t lower financial transactions tax
cl harmonization of European corporation law
it progressive income tax
f s higher tax on foreign stocks flotation on the London stock exchange
h fox hunting
at lower tax on agricultural sector
s national sovereignty
ur reduced rights for union representatives in factories
ds tax deductions for savings of lower income workers
pd return to the pre-decimal currency system
Let ZS := {zF , zD, zB} and ZP := {zL, zC, zX}, where
zF Factory workers in Manchester F := {+st,+o}
zD Extended family of Duke of Westminster D := {+lt,+ap}
zB London City Bankers B := {+f t,−cl}
zL Labour party L := {+it,+f s,−h}
zC Conservative party C := {+at,+h,+ur}
zX Brexit party X := {+s,+ds,+pd}
To calculate the similarity between political parties, we need to compare their positions in terms of issues. However, 
since there is ostensibly little overlap in the issues as formulated, we will impose an equivalence relation ∼P to abstract 
the broad kinds of issues and use that for the comparison. Suppose the equivalence classes of ∼P are given by grouping 
income tax issues together and ‘heritage issues’ together, while keeping other issues separate, as follows:
{{it, at, ds}, {f s}, {h,pd}, {s}, {ur}}.
In the same way, to calculate the similarity between social groups, we impose an equivalence relation ∼S on their 
issues, equating tax issues while distinguishing other issues:
{{st, lt, f t}, {o}, {ap}, {cl}}.
The equivalence class of an issue i under ∼P (respectively, ∼S ) is denoted by [i]P (respectively, [i]S ).
For the purposes of this case study, we choose to take as truth-value algebra the 11-element Łukasiewicz chain 
A with domain {0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1}. The reasons for this choice are discussed in Remark 5.1, below. The similarity 
relations between ZS and ZP takes values in A as indicated in the following diagram:
















The values of these relations are calculated according to the formula given above, with rounding as necessary. For 
example, ES(zF , zD) = |{[st]S, [o]S} ∩ {[lt]S, [h]S}| ÷ |{[st]S, [o]S}| = |{[st]S}| ÷ |{[st]S, [o]S}| = 0.5. In order to 
define the relation R♦ : ZS × ZP → A, we will use the following recognition functions:
fF f s it h at s ur ds pd
st 0 0.9 0 0.2 0 0 0.2 0
o 0.5 0 0 0 0.4 0 0 0
fD f s it h at s ur ds pd
lt 0 0.2 0 0.6 0 0 0 0
ap 0 0 0.8 0 0.2 0 0 0
fB f s it h at s ur ds pd
f t 0 0 0 0.4 0 0 0.3 0
cl 0.3 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0
This enables us to calculate, e.g. R♦(zF , zL) = [(fF (st, it) + fF (o, f s)) ÷ |{fF (st, it), fF (o, st)}|] = (0.9 + 0.5) ÷










The recognition function of the political parties are given by:
fL st o lt ap f t cl
f s 0 0.2 0 0 0 0.3
it 0.8 0 0.2 0 0 0
h 0 0 0 0 0 0
fC st o lt ap f t cl
at 0.3 0 0.4 0 0 0
h 0 0 0 0.6 0 0
ur 0 0 0 0 0 0.4
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s 0 0.8 0 0.2 0 0.5
ds 0.4 0 0 0 0.3 0
pd 0 0 0 0.2 0 0











Notice that e.g. zL has a lower degree of affinity to zF than zF has to zL; this difference is due to the asymmetry 
between the way in which the Labour party recognises its issues in the issues of the factory workers and the way in 
which factory workers recognise theirs in those of the Labour party.
Let σF , σD, σB ∈ SD and πL, πC, πU ∈ PP respectively represent the following social demands and political 
promises:
σF (st, o) lower taxes on salaries by cutting social benefits for foreigners
σD(lt, ap) right for the house of lords to veto laws on grounds of national interest
σB(f t, cl) UK companies are allowed to pay the salaries of their employees only through UK banks
πL(it, f s,h) tax-money used to enforce fox hunting ban
πC(at, h) reducing the use of tax-money for enforcing fox hunting ban
πX(s) increasing national sovereignty
Each demand (resp. promise) is phrased in terms of some of the issues relevant to a social group (resp. political 
party). Each PP-formula is ‘tested’ on social situations (β, z) ∈ A × ZS and each SD-formula on political situations
(β, z) ∈ A × ZP , and the outcome of these ‘tests’ is encoded into interpretation maps for each σ ∈ {σF , σD, σB} and 
each π ∈ {πL, πC, πX} of the following types:
π : A × ZS → A ([π]) : ZS → A
σ  : A × ZP → A ([σ ]) : ZP → A
where as usual, for each formula ϕ, the A-set ϕ : A × Z → A indicates the extent to which ϕ is supported on each 
situation of the appropriate type, and ([ϕ]) : Z → A the extent to which it is rejected at each state of the appropriate 
type. In the setting of [4], the intended interpretation of β is the flexibility in translating/operationalizing data to 
variables. In analogy with this interpretation, we propose that when political promises are evaluated in situations 
(β, z) where z is a social group, β captures the maximum degree of flexibility in how voting (polling) is translated 
into the expression of the will of the group z. This degree might include or take into account e.g. the representativity 
of the sample, but also how rigorously the rules governing the test (e.g. eligibility criteria) are enforced, voter turnout, 
features of the electoral system like proportional representation vs first-past-the-post, etc. When social demands are 
evaluated in situation (β, z) where z is a political party, β captures the maximum degree of flexibility in the outcome 
of the “test” is interpreted as the reflecting the position of the party on that demand. Under a high β value, one would 
be allowed to assign high significance to e.g. informal consultations among members of the party, while lower β
values would require higher standards of evidence, e.g. official policy documents of formal declarations following a 
party congress.
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and columns by Z-elements. Moreover, we represent ([ϕ]) : Z → A as a triple (α, β, γ ) where (α, β, γ ) =
(([ϕ])(zF ), ([ϕ])(zD), ([ϕ])(zB)) if Z = ZS , and (α, β, γ ) = (([ϕ])(zL), ([ϕ])(zC), ([ϕ])(zX)) if Z = ZP . Then, using 
this notation, suppose that the interpretation of the political promises πL results in the following outcome:
πL zF zD zB
0.0 0.6 0.1 0.2
0.1 0.7 0.2 0.3
0.2 0.8 0.3 0.4
0.3 0.9 0.4 0.5
0.4 1.0 0.5 0.6
0.5 1.0 0.6 0.7
0.6 1.0 0.7 0.8
0.7 1.0 0.8 0.9
0.8 1.0 0.9 1.0
0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
([πL]) = (0.4, 0.9, 0.8).
A noticeable feature of the table for πL is that, from the second row onwards, the value of any entry is always 
exactly 0.1 greater than the entry one row above in the same column. This is no coincidence, and will be the case if 
the truth value algebra A is any finite subalgebra of the standard Łukasiewics algebra. One can verify this by noting 
























As a result, we will represent the values of the other political promises and social demands more compactly, by giving 
only the first row of the table in each case. So, suppose that the interpretation of the political promises πC and πX
results in the following outcomes:
πC zF zD zB













πX zF zD zB













with ([πC]) = (0.8, 0.3, 0.3) and ([πX]) = (0.4, 0.8, 0.6). Suppose further that the interpretation of the social demand 
above results in the following outcomes:
σF  zL zC zX













σD zL zC zX













σB zL zC zX













with ([σF ]) = (0.4, 0.7, 0.4), ([σD]) = (0.7, 0.4, 0.7) and ([σB ]) = (0.7, 0.4, 0.4).
We are now in a position to compute the extensions of the SD-formulas πL, πC πU , and of the PP-formulas 
♦σF , ♦σD , ♦σB . We will only consider and interpret two examples. It can be verified that:
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πC zL zC zX













Recall that πC measured the reaction from the three social groups to the promise by the Conservative Party to 
reduce the use of tax money to enforce the fox hunting ban. This was supported by both the Duke’s social group 
and the bankers to the extent 0.7 (with β = 0), presumably since both groups seek lower taxes and, in the first case, 
also presumably since fox hunting is part of British aristocratic culture. The factory workers’ support was low, at 0.2. 
Now πC represents the response of the three political parties to this information: notice that it is proportional 
to the extent to which the target demographics respond to the promise and the extent to which they are targeted by 
the parties. For example, given their main target demographics, namely the Duke’s social group and the bankers, the 
Tories are more favourably inclined towards their own promise than is Labour, whose main target demographic, the 
factory workers, don’t respond very well to this promise. The Brexit party lies in between, since there is a mixed 
response from their main target demographics, namely the factory workers and bankers.
Turning to ♦σD, recall that σD represents the degree of support the three political parties give (e.g. as measured 
by statements of members of the party, policy documents etc.) to the social group of the Duke’s demand for veto 
powers for the house of lords. The value of ♦σD in turn represents the response of the three social groups to this 
support expressed by the political parties. Neither the factory workers nor the bankers show any enthusiasm, while 
the Duke’s social group shows a more positive response, since their party of choice gives a fair measure of support to 
their demand.
A few remarks on some technical aspects of this case study are in order.
Remark 5.1. For the purposes of this case study, we chose to take as truth-value algebra the 11-element Łukasiewicz 
chain A with domain {0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1}. This choice is made, firstly, because it gives a convenient and manageable 
range of truth values which is yet large enough to accommodate the distinctions and gradations needed to tell our story. 
In this regard we could of course have worked equally well with the 11-element Gödel chain, but the Łukasiewicz 
implication is in a sense more nuanced than the Heyting implication (α → β = β whenever, β < α in a Gödel chain, 
whereas the value of the corresponding Łukasiewicz implication also depends on the specific value of α) which is 
the second reason for our choice. In general the choice of truth value algebra is up to the modeller who can use any 
residuated lattice appropriate to the situation under consideration, subject the constraints specified in Section 2.2.
Remark 5.2. The role of the value β in evaluating political promises in social situations and social demands in political 
situations has both a mathematical basis in the duality upon which our semantics is built and a natural role in modelling 
the type of socio-political situations considered in this case study. Since the situations are, mathematically speaking, 
symmetrical, we will only consider the evaluation of political promises in social situations. As already discussed 
above, for a political promise π , the A-set π : A × ZS → A indicates the extent to which π is supported in each 
‘social situation’ (β, z) where β is a truth value and z a social group. The necessity to evaluate promises at such truth 
value-social group pairs, rather than simply on social groups, arises mathematically from the duality between normal 
heterogeneous LMT-algebras and many-valued heterogeneous models – this, albeit in a single-sorted environment, 
is discussed at length in [6, Section 7], while [10, Section 2] offers more general considerations on obtaining relation 
semantics for algebraically captured logics via dual-characterization. These mathematical underpinnings aside, the 
truth value β is naturally interpreted as a degree of liberality in ascribing support to a promise π . Indeed, since 
ϕ(β, z) = ∧z′∈ZX [([ϕ])(z′) → (E(z, z′) → β)], it is clear that higher values of β translate into higher degrees of 
ascribed support. In practice, a low value for β might be associated with an attribution of support based on surveys 
conducted in accordance with best practice norms including rigorous sampling methods and statistical practices etc. 
Higher values of β can be associated with less rigorous methods that could allow for more bias in favour of attributing 
support to the promise.
Remark 5.3. If our framework is to be used for modelling and reasoning about real-world situations, one needs a 
way of translating empirical data into truth values assigned to political promises and social demands evaluated at truth 
value-social group pairs and truth-value-political party pairs, respectively. Of the various ways in which this could be 
done, we describe what is probably the most natural one, by way of example. Suppose we want to assign truth values 
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are conducted in order to gauge their support. Based on the survey of the factory workers, it is estimated that 80% of 
them are in favour of this promise. Moreover, by evaluating the methodology employed to do the survey, it is judged 
that there is a 20% chance that the support is overstated. These two facts translate into a truth value assignment of 0.8
to πL at the pair (0.2, zF ) and, based on the discussion above about how truth values are dependent on β-values, 
this can be extrapolated to an assignment at pairs (β, zF ) for all other β-values, indeed to the very assignment used 
in the case study. The truth values at other pairs are then similarly determined by looking at the surveys of the Duke’s 
family and of the Bankers, respectively, and taking into account the chances that these surveys overstate the support.
6. Epilogue
We suggest that several interesting analogies can be drawn between competition of theories in the empirical 
sciences (cf. [4]) and competition of social groups and political parties embodying socio-political theories; these 
analogies can be drawn thanks to the general formal framework adopted both in [4] and in the present paper, which 
we have illustrated with the case study discussed in the previous section.
In [4], the competition of scientific theories (identified with sets of relevant variables) plays out in the arena of 
(a given graph of) databases, each of which is built according to a different theory, and therefore has different degrees 
of similarity to other databases in the graph. Theories X and Y compete by having their respective (key) hypotheses 
ϕ(X) and ψ(Y ) tested on all the databases of the given graph; each of these databases will be more or less suitable to 
test a given hypothesis. Hence, a clear-cut case in which X outcompetes Y is if, while each hypothesis is expected to 
score well on its ‘home-ground’ (i.e. on the databases built in accordance with the theory in the variables of which the 
given hypothesis is formulated, or maximally similar to those), the performances of ϕ(X) on the databases that are not 
its own ‘home-ground’ are better than the performances of ψ(Y ) on the databases that are not its own ‘home-ground’.
Likewise, political competition between parties plays out in the arena of (a given graph of) social groups, each of 
which has its own ‘social theory’ (represented as the set of issues relevant to that social group), and therefore has 
different degrees of similarity to other social groups in the graph. Parties X and Y compete by having their respective 
(key) promises π1(X) and π2(Y ) tested on all the social groups of the given graph. While each of these social groups 
will be more or less receptive or supportive of a given promise, it is to be expected that a promise will score well on its 
‘home-ground’, i.e. on the social groups with strong affinity to the party and its position, and typically less well social 
groups that are not its own ‘home-ground’. Hence, one clear-cut case in which X outcompetes Y would be when the 
performance of π1(X) on the social groups that are not its own ‘home-ground’ is better than the performance of π2(Y )
on the social groups that are not its own ‘home-ground’.
The socio-political competition has a further interesting twist, given by the possibility of simultaneously repre-
senting the competition between social groups playing out in the arena of political parties. Again, a winner of this 
competition is a social group the demands of which are ‘listened to’ by a wider audience of political parties than their 
‘home-ground’.
Key to the possibility of winning on ‘away-ground’ is a mechanism that is well known in the practice of science, 
and consists in the possibility of retrieving the values of variables that are not as such represented in the database 
by using “translations” of the values of other variables as proxies. We have proposed that certain unexpected socio-
political alignments can be better understood in terms of an analogous mechanism in which issues that figure in the 
program of a political party can be translated into issues that figure on the agenda of social group, and vice versa.
Finally, although stylised and simplified, this framework offers the possibility to analyse two competitive processes 
playing out at the same time, thereby paving the way to the possibility of formulating and answering a whole different 
range of formal questions about socio-political dynamics.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have introduced a many-valued semantic environment for a multi-type modal language based on 
the logic of general (i.e. not necessarily distributive) lattices. We have proved soundness and completeness for the 
basic logic, and, by means of a case study, we have illustrated the potential of this framework as a tool for the formal 
analysis of socio-political competition.
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analysts to structure their study and conceptualization of socio-political dynamics. Within increasingly complex politi-
cal landscapes, it becomes difficult for voters to make informed political decisions. This can be mitigated by automated 
tools which aid voters in matching their issues and positions with the policies and promises of political parties. A good 
example is the Dutch website https://www.kieskompas .nl which offers such tools to voters and where, in turn, the data 
submitted by users can be used by political parties to align their policies to the wishes of the social groups which they 
target. The logical framework proposed in this paper makes the alignment of social demands and political positions 
central to its analysis, and so may serve as a basis for such tools. For example, particular socio-political landscapes 
can be modelled using heterogeneous A-models, after which the demands of a voter, a social group or lobby group can 
be encoded as a formula which is then model checked on the available political parties in the model to determine the 
best match. Conversely, similar strategies may also be used by politicians and their campaign managers to align their 
agendas with those of their constituencies. Abstracting away from particular situations, (extensions of) the deductive 
system which we introduced and proved complete, can be used to derive ‘laws of socio-political interaction’.
We conclude by discussing some further questions arising from this preliminary exploration.
Expanding the language with fixed points. Building on [12], ‘dual common knowledge’ formulas such as 
μX.♦(X ∧ π) and μX.♦(X ∧ σ) can be understood as describing the convergence of ongoing processes of inter-
action between social groups and political parties. It would be interesting to use the expressive power of (multi-type) 
lattice-based fixed-point logic to describe and reason about these phenomena.
Towards an analysis of the dynamics of socio-political competition. Related to the previous point, the framework 
introduced in this paper lends itself to the formal analysis of the dynamics triggered by the interplay of social groups 
and political parties, a theme on which recent research in political science has focused (cf. e.g. [23,28]). This direction 
would address questions relative e.g. to the emergence of political parties in response to issues which are relevant to 
certain social groups, or to the emergence of novel social group identities by effect of certain political alignments. 
The framework also offers new connections to the dynamics of market categories [29] and the appreciation of new 
members of old and new categories [22] by different audiences.
Acknowledgements
The first author gratefully acknowledges the generous financial support of the Faculty of Science at the University 
of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
Appendix A. Completeness
For the sake of uniformity with previous settings (cf. e.g. [6, Section 7.2]) in this section, we work with graph-based 
frames G = (XS, XP , R♦, R) the associated complex algebras of which are different from those of Definition 3.1. 
That is, for the sake of this section, for every graph X = (E, Z), we define its associated formal context PX :=
(ZA, ZX, IE) by setting ZA := Z, ZX := A × Z and IE : ZA × ZX → A be defined by the assignment (z, (α, z′)) →
E(z, z′) → α.
For any lattice L, an A-filter is an A-subset of L, i.e. a map f : L → A, which is both ∧- and -preserving, 
i.e. f () = 1 and f (a ∧ b) = f (a) ∧ f (b) for any a, b ∈ L. Intuitively, the ∧-preservation encodes a many-valued 
version of closure under ∧ of filters. An A-filter is proper if it is also ⊥-preserving, i.e. f (⊥) = 0. Dually, an A-ideal
is a map i : L → A which is both ∨- and ⊥-reversing, i.e. i(⊥) =  and i(a ∨ b) = i(a) ∧ i(b) for any a, b ∈ L, 
and is proper if in addition i() = 0. The complement of a (proper) A-ideal is a map u : L → A which is both ∨-
and ⊥-preserving, i.e. u(⊥) = 0 and u(a ∨ b) = u(a) ∨ u(b) for any a, b ∈ L (and in addition u() = 1). Intuitively, 
u(a) encodes the extent to which a does not belong to the ideal of which u is the many-valued complement. We 
let FA(L), IA(L) and CA(L) respectively denote the set of proper A-filters, proper A-ideals, and the complements 
of proper A-ideals of L. For any heterogeneous LMT-algebra (LS, LP , ♦, ) (cf. Definition 2.1) and all A-subsets 
k : LP → A and h : LS → A, let k− : LS → A and h−♦ : LP → A be defined as k−(s) = ∨{k(p) | p ≤ s}
and h−♦(p) = ∨{h(s) | ♦s ≤ p}, respectively. Then, by definition, k(p) ≤ k−(p) and h(s) ≤ h−♦(♦s) for every 
p ∈ LP and s ∈ LS . Let (SD, PP, ♦, ) be the Lindenbaum–Tarski heterogeneous algebra associated with L.
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1. If f :LP → A is an A-filter, then so is f −.
2. If g :LS → A is an A-filter, then so is g−♦.
3. If f : PP → A is a proper A-filter, then so is f −.
4. If g : SD → A is a proper A-filter, then so is g−♦.
5. If π1, π2 ∈ PP, then π1 ∨ π2 =  implies that π1 =  or π2 = .
6. If σ1, σ2 ∈ SD, then σ1 ∨ σ2 =  implies that σ1 =  or σ2 = .
Proof. 1. For all s, t ∈ LS ,
f −() = ∨{f (p) | p ≤ }
= ∨{f (p) | p ∈ L}
= f ()
= 1
f −(s) ∧ f −(t)
= ∨{f (p1) | p1 ≤ s} ∧ ∨{f (p2) | p2 ≤ t}
= ∨{f (p1) ∧ f (p2) | p1 ≤ s and p2 ≤ b} frame-distributivity
= ∨{f (p1 ∧ p2) | p1 ≤ s and p2 ≤ t} f is an A-filter
= ∨{f (p) | p ≤ s and p ≤ t} (∗)
= ∨{f (p) | p ≤ s ∧ t}
= f −(s ∧ t),
the equivalence marked with (∗) being due to the fact that (p1 ∧ p2) ≤ p1 ∧ p2.
3. Let f : PP → A be a proper A-filter. f −(⊥) = ∨{f ([π]) | [π] ≤ [⊥]} = ∨{f ([π]) | π 
 ⊥} =∨{f ([π]) | π 
 ⊥} = f ([⊥]) = 0. The crucial inequality is the third to last, which holds since π 
 ⊥ iff π 
 ⊥. 
The right to left implication can be easily derived in L. For the sake of the left to right implication we appeal to the 
completeness of L with respect to the class of all heterogeneous LMT-algebras (cf. Proposition 2.2, see [10] for the 
general case) and reason contrapositively. Suppose π  ⊥. Then, by Proposition 2.2, there is a normal heterogeneous 
LMT-algebra H = (LS, LP , ♦, ) and assignment h of atomic propositions such that h(π) = 0. Now consider the 
heterogeneous algebra (LS, L′P , ♦, ) obtained from (LS, LP , ♦, ) by adding a new least element 0′ to LP and 
extending the -operation by declaring 0′ = 0′. We keep the assignment h unchanged. It is easy to check that 
(LS, L′P , ♦, ) is a normal heterogeneous LMT-algebra, and that h(π) ≥ 0 > 0′ and hence π  ⊥.
Items 2 and 4 are proven by arguments analogous to the ones above.
5. Suppose, by contraposition, that   π1 and   π2. By the completeness theorem to which we have appealed 
in the proof of item 2, there are heterogeneous algebras H1 = (LS1 , LP1 , ♦1, 1) and H2 = (LS2 , LP2 , ♦2, 2) and 
corresponding assignments vi on Hi such that v1(π1) = LP1 and v2(π2) = LP2 . Consider the algebra H′ = (LS1 ×
LS2 , L
P ′ , ′, ♦′), where LP ′ is obtained by adding a new top element ′ to LP1 × LP2 , defining the operation ′ by 
the same assignment of H1×H2 on LP1 × LP2 and mapping ′ to ()LS1 ×LS2 , and the operation ♦′ by the same 
assignment of ♦H1×H2 on LS1 ×LS2 . The monotonicity of ′ and normality (i.e. finite join-preservation) of ♦′ follow 
immediately by construction. The normality (i.e. finite join-preservation) of ′ is verified by cases: if a ∨b = ′, then 
it immediately follows from the normality of H1×H2 . If a ∨ b = ′, then by construction, either a = ′ or b = ′
(i.e. ′ is join-irreducible), and hence, the join-preservation of ′ is a consequence of its monotonicity. Consider the 
valuation v′ : Prop → H′ defined by the assignment p → e(v1(p), v2(p)), where e : H1 × H2 → H′ is the natural 
embedding.
Let us show, for all χ ∈ PP, that if (v1(χ), v2(χ)) = LP1 ×LP2 , then v′(χ) = ′. We proceed by induction on χ . The 
cases for atomic propositions and conjunction are immediate. The case for χ := π ′1 ∨ π ′2 uses the join-irreducibility 
of ′. When χ := ♦σ , then v′(♦σ) = ♦′v′(σ ) = ′, since, by construction, ′ is not in the range of ♦′.
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= LP1 ×LP2 and (v1(π2), v2(π2)) =
LP1 ×LP2 . So, by the above claim, v′(π1) = ′ and v′(π2) = ′, and hence, since ′ is join-irreducible, v′(ϕ ∨ ψ) =
′.
The proof of item 6 is analogous to the one above. 








−♦(p) → u(p)) = ∧s∈LS (g(s) → u(♦s)).
Proof. 1. The fact that f (p) ≤ f −(p) implies that f −(p) → v(p) ≤ f (p) → v(p) for every p ∈ LP , 
which is enough to show that 
∧
s∈LS (f
−(s) → v(s)) ≤ ∧p∈LP (f (p) → v(p)). Conversely, to show that∧
p∈LP
(f (p) → v(p)) ≤ ∧
s∈LS
(f −(s) → v(s)),
we have to show that, for every s ∈LS ,∧
p∈LP
(f (p) → v(p)) ≤ f −(s) → v(s),
i.e. by definition of f −(s) and the fact that → is completely join-reversing in its first coordinate,∧
p∈LP
(f (p) → v(p)) ≤ ∧
q≤s
(f (q) → v(s)).
Hence, let q ∈LP such that q ≤ s, and let us show that∧
p∈LP
(f (p) → v(p)) ≤ f (q) → v(s).
Since v is ∨-preserving, hence order-preserving, q ≤ s implies v(q) ≤ v(s), hence∧
p∈LP
(f (p) → v(p)) ≤ f (q) → v(q) ≤ f (q) → v(s),
as required. The proof of the second item is analogous and omitted. 
Definition A.3. Let (SD, PP, ♦, ) be the Lindenbaum-Tarski heterogeneous algebra of LMT-formulas.9 The canon-
ical graph-based A-frame is the structure G = (XS, XP , R, R♦) defined as follows10:
ZS :=
{
(f,u) ∈ FA(PP) × CA(PP) |
∧
π∈PP





(g, v) ∈ FA(SD) × CA(SD) |
∧
σ∈SD
(g(σ ) → v(σ )) = 1
}
.
For any z ∈ ZS (resp. z ∈ ZP ) as above, we let fz and uz (resp. gz and vz) denote the first and second coordinate of z, 







9 In the remainder of this section, we abuse notation and identify formulas with their equivalence class in (SD, PP, ♦, ). Also, notice the 
inversion: states in ZS (resp. ZP ) are built out of structures from PP (resp. SD).
10 Recall that for any set W , the A-subsethood relation between elements of A-subsets of W is the map SW : AW × AW → A defined as 
SW (f, g) :=
∧
w∈W (f (w) → g(w)). If SW (f, g) = 1 we also write f ⊆ g.




(gz(σ ) → vz′(σ ));













z′ (π) → uz(π)) =
∧
σ∈SD
(gz′(σ ) → uz(♦σ)).
Lemma A.4. The structure G of Definition A.3 is a graph-based A-frame, in the sense specified at the beginning of 
the present section.
Proof. We need to show that R and R♦ satisfy the following compatibility conditions: for every z ∈ ZP and all 
α, β ∈ A,
(R
[1] [{β/(α, z)}])[10] ⊆ R[1] [{β/(α, z)}]
(R
[0]
♦ [{β/z}])[01] ⊆ R[0]♦ [{β/z}],
and for every z ∈ ZS and all α, β ∈ A,
(R
[1]
♦ [{β/(α, z)}])[10] ⊆ R[1]♦ [{β/(α, z)}]
(R
[0] [{β/z}])[01] ⊆ R[0] [{β/z}].
Let us show the fourth inclusion above. By definition, for any (α, w) ∈ ZPX ,
R
[0] [{β/z}](α,w) = ∧z′∈ZSA [{β/z}(z′) → (R(w, z′) → α)]
= β → (R(w, z) → α)
(R
[0] [{β/z}])[01](α,w) = ∧z′∈ZPA [(R[0] [{β/z}])[0](z′) → (EP (z′,w) → α)],
and hence it is enough to find some z′ ∈ ZPA such that
(R




[β → (R(z′′, z) → γ )] → (EP (z′, z′′) → γ )
⎞
⎟⎠ → (EP (z′,w) → α) ≤ β → (R(w, z) → α). (2)
Let z′ ∈ ZAP such that gz′ = f −z (cf. Lemma A.1). Then
EP (z
′,w) = ∧σ∈SD(f −z (σ ) → vw(σ )) = R(w, z),
and likewise EP (z′, z′′) = R(z′′, z). Therefore, for this choice of z′, inequality (2) can be rewritten as follows:⎛
⎜⎝ ∧
(γ,z′′)∈ZPX
[β → (R(z′′, z) → γ )] → (R(z′′, z) → γ )
⎞
⎟⎠ → (R(w, z) → α) ≤ β → (R(w, z) → α)




[β → (R(z′′, z) → γ )] → (R(z′′, z) → γ ),
i.e. if for every (γ, z′′) ∈ ZP ,X
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which is an instance of a tautology in residuated lattices.
Let z ∈ ZP and α, β ∈ A and let us show that (R[1] [{β/(α, z)}])[10] ⊆ R[1] [{β/(α, z)}]. By definition, for every 
w ∈ ZSA,
R
[1] [{β/(α, z)}](w) = ∧(γ,z′)∈ZPX [{β/(α, z)}(γ, z′) → (R(z′,w) → γ )]
= β → (R(z,w) → α)
(R
[1] [{β/(α, z)}])[10](w) = ∧(γ,z′)∈ZSX [(R[1] [{β/(α, z)}])[1](γ, z′) → (ES(w, z′) → γ )].
Hence it is enough to find some (γ, z′) ∈ ZSX such that
(R




(β → (R(z, z′′) → α)) → (ES(z′′, z′) → γ )
⎞
⎟⎠ → (ES(w, z′) → γ ) ≤ β → (R(z,w) → α). (3)
Let γ := β , and z′ = (fz′ , uz′) ∈ ZS such that uz′ : PP → A is defined by the assignment
uz′(π) =
{
1 if  
 π
vz(π) otherwise.
By construction, uz′ maps  to 1 and ⊥ to 0; moreover, using Lemma A.1.5, it can be readily verified that uz′ is 





(fz′′(π) → uz′(π)) =
∧
π∈PP
(fz′′(π) → vz(π)) = ∧
σ∈SD
(f −
z′′ (σ ) → vz(π)) = R(z, z′′),
and likewise E(w, z′) = R(z, w). Therefore, for this choice of z′, inequality (3) can be rewritten as follows:⎛
⎜⎝ ∧
z′′∈ZSA
(β → (R(z, z′′) → α)) → (R(z, z′′) → γ )
⎞
⎟⎠ → (R(z,w) → γ ) ≤ β → (R(z,w) → α),
which is shown to be true by the same argument as the one concluding the verification of the previous inclusion. The 
remaining inclusions are verified with analogous arguments to those above (using Lemma A.1.6), and their proofs are 
omitted. 
Definition A.5. Let (SD, PP, ♦, ) be the Lindenbaum-Tarski heterogeneous algebra of LMT-formulas. The canon-
ical graph-based A-model is the structure M = (G, V ) such that G is the canonical graph-based A-frame of Defini-
tion A.3, and if p ∈ Prop, then VS : Prop →X+P and VP : Prop → X+S are such that:
1. VS(p) = (pS, ([p])S) with pS : ZPA → A and ([p])S : ZPX → A defined by z → gz(p) and (α, z) → vz(p) →
α, respectively;
2. VP (p) = (pP , ([p])P ) with pP : ZSA → A and ([p])P : ZSX → A defined by z → fz(p) and (α, z) → uz(p) →
α, respectively.
Lemma A.6. The structure G of Definition A.5 is a graph-based A-model.
Proof. It is enough to show that for any p ∈ Prop,
1. p[1] = ([p])P and pP = ([p])[0].P P
W. Conradie et al. / Fuzzy Sets and Systems 407 (2021) 115–141 1352. p[1]S = ([p])S and pS = ([p])[0]S , and
We only show 1. To show that ([p])P (α, z) ≤ p[1]P (α, z) for any (α, z) ∈ ZSX , by definition, we need to show that




′) → (ES(z′, z) → α)),
i.e. that for every z′ ∈ ZSA,
uz(p) → α ≤ pP (z′) → (ES(z′, z) → α).
By definition, the inequality above is equivalent to
uz(p) → α ≤ fz′(p) →
( ∧
π∈PP





π∈PP(fz′(π) → uz(π)) ≤ fz′(p) → uz(p) and → is order-reversing in its first coordinate, it is enough to 
show that
uz(p) → α ≤ fz′(p) → [(fz′(p) → uz(p)) → α].
By residuation the inequality above is equivalent to
uz(p) → α ≤ [fz′(p) ⊗ (fz′(p) → uz(p))] → α,
which is equivalent to
[fz′(p) ⊗ (fz′(p) → uz(p)] ⊗ [uz(p) → α] ≤ α,
which is the instance of a tautology in residuated lattices. Conversely, to show that p[1]P (α, z) ≤ ([p])P (α, z), i.e.∧
z′∈ZSA
(pP (z
′) → (ES(z′, z) → α)) ≤ uz(p) → α,
it is enough to show that
pP (z
′) → (ES(z′, z) → α)) ≤ uz(p) → α (4)




1 if p 
 π
0 otherwise.
Hence, ES(z′, z) = ∧π∈PP(fp(π) → uz(π)) = ∧p
π uz(π) = uz(p), the last identity holding since uz is order-
preserving. Therefore, pP (z′) → (ES(z′, z) → α)) = fp(p) → (uz(p) → α) = 1 → (uz(p) → α) = uz(p) → α, 
which shows (4).
By adjunction, the inequality ([p])P ≤ p[1]P proven above implies that pP ≤ ([p])[0]P . Hence, to show that pP =
([p])[0]P , it is enough to show that ([p])[0]P (z) ≤ pP (z) for every z ∈ ZS , i.e.∧
(α,z′)∈ZSX
([p])P (α, z′) → (ES(z, z′) → α) ≤ fz(p),
and to show the inequality above, it is enough to show that
([p])P (α, z′) → (ES(z, z′) → α) ≤ fz(p) (5)
for some (α, z′) ∈ ZSX . Let α := fz(p) and z′ := (fz′ , up) be such that uz′ = up : PP → A is defined by the following 
assignment:
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⎧⎨
⎩
0 if π 
 ⊥
fz(p) if π 
 p and π  ⊥
1 if π  p.
By construction, uz′ is ∨-, ⊥- and -preserving. Moreover, ([p])P (α, z′) = uz′(p) → α = fz(p) → fz(p) = 1, and 
ES(z, z′) = ∧π∈PP(fz(π) → uz′(π)) = ∧π
p(fz(π) → fz(p)) = 1. Hence, the left-hand side of (5) can be equiva-
lently rewritten as 1 → (1 → fz(p)) = fz(p), which shows (5) and concludes the proof. 
Lemma A.7 (Truth Lemma). For every π ∈ PP and every σ ∈ SD,
1. the maps πP : ZSA → A and ([π])P : ZSX → A coincide with those defined by the assignments z → fz(π) and 
(α, z) → uz(π) → α, respectively.
2. the maps σ S : ZPA → A and ([σ ])S : ZPX → A coincide with those defined by the assignments z → gz(σ ) and 
(α, z) → vz(σ ) → α, respectively.
Proof. We proceed by simultaneous induction on π and σ . If π := p ∈ Prop (resp. σ := p ∈ Prop), the statement 
follows immediately from Definition A.5.
If π := , then P (z) = 1 = fz() since A-filters are -preserving. Moreover,
([])P (α, z) = [1]P (α, z)
= ∧z′∈ZSA[(z′) → (ES(z′, z) → α)]
= ∧z′∈ZSA[fz′() → (ES(z′, z) → α)]
= ∧z′∈ZSA[ES(z′, z) → α].
So, to show that uz() → α ≤ ([])P (α, z), we need to show that for every z′ ∈ ZSA,
uz() → α ≤ ES(z′, z) → α,
and for this, it is enough to show that∧
π ′∈PP
[fz′(π ′) → uz(π ′)] ≤ uz(),
which is true, since by definition, uz() = 1. To show that ([])P (α, z) ≤ uz() → α, i.e. that∧
z′∈ZSA
[ES(z′, z) → α] ≤ uz() → α,
it is enough to find some z′ ∈ ZS such that ES(z′, z) → α ≤ uz() → α. Let z′ := (f, u) such that u : PP → A maps 
 to 1 and every other element of PP to 0, and f : PP → A is defined by the assignment
f(π ′) =
{
1 if  
 π ′
0 otherwise.
By definition, ES(z′, z) = ∧π ′∈PP[fz′(π ′) → uz(π ′)] = ∧
π ′ [1 → uz(π ′)] = ∧
π ′ uz(π ′) ≥ uz(), the last in-
equality being due to the fact that uz is order-preserving. Hence, ES(z′, z) → α ≤ uz() → α, as required. The case 
in which σ :=  is analogous to the one above, and its proof is omitted.
If π := ⊥, then ([⊥])P (α, z) = 1 = uz(⊥) → α since complements of A-ideals are ⊥-preserving. Let us show that 
⊥P (z) = fz(⊥). The inequality fz(⊥) ≤ ⊥P (z) follows immediately from the fact that fz is a proper A-filter and 
hence fz(⊥) = 0. To show that ⊥P (z) ≤ fz(⊥), by definition ⊥P (z) = ([⊥])[0](z) = ∧(α,z′)∈ZSX [(uz′(⊥) → α) →
(ES(z, z′) → α)], hence, it is enough to find some (α, z′) ∈ ZSX such that
(uz′(⊥) → α) → (ES(z, z′) → α) ≤ fz(⊥). (6)
Let α := fz(⊥) and let z′ := (f, u⊥) such that f : PP → A is defined as indicated above in the base case for π := , 
and u⊥ : PP → A is defined by the assignment
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{
0 if π ′ 
 ⊥
1 if π ′  ⊥.
By definition and since fz is order-preserving and ⊥-preserving, ES(z, z′) = ∧π ′∈PP[fz(π ′) → u⊥(π ′)] = 1. Hence, 
(6) can be rewritten as follows:
(fz(⊥) → fz(⊥)) → fz(⊥) ≤ fz(⊥),
which is true since fz(⊥) → fz(⊥) = 1 and 1 → fz(⊥) = fz(⊥). The case in which σ := ⊥ is analogous to the one 
above, and its proof is omitted.
If π := π1 ∧ π2, then π1 ∧ π2P (z) = (π1P ∧ π2)P (z) = π1P (z) ∧ π2P (z) = fz(π1) ∧ fz(π2) = fz(π1 ∧
π2). Let us show that ([π1 ∧ π2])P (α, z) = uz(π1 ∧ π2) → α. By definition,
([π1 ∧ π2])P (α, z)
=π1 ∧ π2[1]P (α, z)
=∧z′∈ZSA[π1 ∧ π2P (z′) → (ES(z′, z) → α)]
=∧z′∈ZSA[fz′(π1 ∧ π2) → (ES(z′, z) → α)].
Hence, to show that uz(π1 ∧ π2) → α ≤ ([π1 ∧ π2])P (α, z), we need to show that for every z′ ∈ ZSA,
uz(π1 ∧ π2) → α ≤ fz′(π1 ∧ π2) → (ES(z′, z) → α).
Since by definition ES(z′, z) = ∧π ′∈PP[fz′(π ′) → uz(π ′)] ≤ fz′(π1 ∧ π2) → uz(π1 ∧ π2) and → is order-reversing 
in the first coordinate and order-preserving in the second one, it is enough to show that for every z′ ∈ ZSA,
uz(π1 ∧ π2) → α ≤ fz′(π1 ∧ π2) → ((fz′(π1 ∧ π2) → uz(π1 ∧ π2)) → α).
By residuation, the above inequality is equivalent to
uz(π1 ∧ π2) → α ≤ [fz′(π1 ∧ π2) ⊗ (fz′(π1 ∧ π2) → uz(π1 ∧ π2))] → α.
The above inequality is true if
fz′(π1 ∧ π2) ⊗ (fz′(π1 ∧ π2) → uz(π1 ∧ π2)) ≤ uz(π1 ∧ π2),
which is an instance of a tautology in residuated lattices.
To show that ([π1 ∧ π2])P (α, z) ≤ uz(π1 ∧ π2) → α, it is enough to find some z′ ∈ ZSA such that
fz′(π1 ∧ π2) → (ES(z′, z) → α) ≤ uz(π1 ∧ π2) → α.
Let z′ := (fπ1∧π2 , u⊥) such that u⊥ : PP → A is defined as indicated above in the base case for π := ⊥, and fπ1∧π2 :
PP → A is defined by the assignment
fπ1∧π2(π ′) =
{
1 if π1 ∧ π2 
 π ′
0 otherwise.
For z′ := z, since fz′(π1 ∧ π2) = 1 and 1 → (ES(z′, z) → α) = ES(z′, z) → α, the inequality above becomes
ES(z
′, z) → α ≤ uz(π1 ∧ π2) → α,
to verify which, it is enough to show that uz(π1 ∧π2) ≤ ES(z′, z). Indeed, by definition, ES(z′, z) = ∧π ′∈PP[fz′(π ′) →
uz(π
′)] = ∧π1∧π2
π ′ [1 → uz(π ′)] = ∧π1∧π2
π ′ uz(π ′) ≥ uz(π1 ∧ π2), the last inequality being due to the fact that 
uz is order-preserving. The case in which σ := σ1 ∧ σ2 is analogous to the one above, and its proof is omitted.
If π := π1 ∨ π2, then ([π1 ∨ π2])P (α, z) = (([π1])P ∧ ([π2])P )(α, z) = ([π1])P (α, z) ∧ ([π2])P (α, z) = (uz(π1) →
α) ∧ (uz(π2) → α) = (uz(π1) ∨ uz(π2)) → α) = uz(π1 ∨ π2) → α. Let us show that π1 ∨ π2P (z) = fz(π1 ∨ π2). 
By definition,
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= ∧(α,z′)∈ZSX [([π1 ∨ π2])P (α, z′) → (ES(z, z′) → α)]
= ∧(α,z′)∈ZSX [(uz′(π1 ∨ π2) → α) → (ES(z, z′) → α)].
Hence, to show that fz(π1 ∨ π2) ≤ π1 ∨ π2(z), we need to show that for every (α, z′) ∈ ZSX ,
fz(π1 ∨ π2) ≤ (uz′(π1 ∨ π2) → α) → (ES(z, z′) → α).
Since by definition ES(z, z′) = ∧π ′∈PP[fz(π ′) → uz′(π ′)] ≤ fz(π1 ∨ π2) → uz′(π1 ∨ π2) and → is order-reversing 
in the first coordinate and order-preserving in the second one, it is enough to show that for every (α, z′) ∈ ZSX ,
fz(π1 ∨ π2) ≤ (uz′(π1 ∨ π2) → α) → ((fz(π1 ∨ π2) → uz′(π1 ∨ π2)) → α).
By residuation, associativity and commutativity of ⊗, the inequality above is equivalent to
fz(π1 ∨ π2) ⊗ (fz(π1 ∨ π2) → uz′(π1 ∨ π2)) ⊗ (uz′(π1 ∨ π2) → α) ≤ α,
which is a tautology in residuated lattices.
To show that π1 ∨ π2P (z) ≤ fz(π1 ∨ π2), it is enough to find some (α, z′) ∈ ZSX such that
(uz′(π1 ∨ π2) → α) → (ES(z′, z) → α) ≤ fz(π1 ∨ π2). (7)
Let α := fz(π1 ∨ π2) and let z′ := (f, uπ1∨π2) such that f : PP → A is defined as indicated above in the base case 




0 if π ′ 
 ⊥
fz(π1 ∨ π2) if π ′ ⊥ and π ′ 
 π1 ∨ π2
1 if π ′  π1 ∨ π2.
By definition and since fz is order-preserving and proper, ES(z, z′) = ∧π ′∈PP[fz(π ′) → uπ1∨π2(ψ)] =∧
⊥π ′
π1∨π2 [fz(π ′) → fz(π1 ∨ π2)] = 1. Hence, (7) can be rewritten as follows:
(fz(π1 ∨ π2) → fz(π1 ∨ π2)) → fz(π1 ∨ π2) ≤ fz(π1 ∨ π2),
which is true since fz(π1 ∨ π2) → fz(π1 ∨ π2) = 1 and 1 → fz(π1 ∨ π2) = fz(π1 ∨ π2). The case in which σ :=
σ1 ∨ σ2 is analogous to the one above, and its proof is omitted.
If σ := π , let us show that ([π])S(α, z) = vz(ψ) → α for any (α, z) ∈ ZPX . By definition,
([π ])S(α, z) = R[0] [πP ](α, z)
= ∧z′∈ZSA[πP (z′) → (R(z, z′) → α)]
= ∧z′∈ZSA[fz′(π) → (R(z, z′) → α)].
Hence, to show that vz(π) → α ≤ ([π ])S(α, z), we need to show that for every z′ ∈ ZSA,
vz(π) → α ≤ fz′(π) → (R(z, z′) → α).
By definition and Lemma A.2, R(z, z′) = ∧π ′∈PP(fz′(π ′) → vz(π ′)) ≤ fz′(π) → vz(π), and since → is order-
reversing in the first coordinate and order-preserving in the second one, it is enough to show that for every z′ ∈ ZSA,
vz(π) → α ≤ fz′(π) → ((fz′(π) → vz(π)) → α).
By residuation, associativity and commutativity of ⊗, the inequality above is equivalent to
[fz′(π) ⊗ (fz′(π) → vz(π))] ⊗ (vz(π) → α) ≤ α,
which is a tautology in residuated lattices.
To show that ([π])S(α, z) ≤ vz(π) → α, it is enough to find some z′ ∈ ZSA such that
fz′(π) → (R(z, z′) → α) ≤ vz(π) → α. (8)
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1 if π 
 π ′
0 otherwise.
By definition and Lemma A.2,
R(z, z′) = ∧π ′∈PP(fz′(π ′) → vz(π ′))
= ∧π
π ′ vz(π ′)
≥ vz(π),
the last inequality being due to the fact that vz and  are order-preserving. Since → is order reversing in the first 
coordinate and order-preserving in the second one, to show (8) it is enough to show that
fz′(π) → (vz(π) → α) ≤ vz(π) → α.
This immediately follows from the fact that, by construction, fz′(π) = 1.
Let us show that πS(z) = gz(π) for every z ∈ ZPA . By definition,
πS(z) = ([π ])[0]S (z)
= ∧(α,z′)∈ZPX [([π ])(α, z′) → (EP (z, z′) → α)]
= ∧(α,z′)∈ZPX [(vz′(π) → α) → (EP (z, z′) → α)].
Hence, to show that gz(π) ≤ πS(z), we need to show that for every (α, z′) ∈ ZPX ,
gz(π) ≤ (vz′(π) → α) → (EP (z, z′) → α).
Since by definition EP (z, z′) = ∧σ ′∈SD[gz(σ ′) → vz′(σ ′)] ≤ gz(π) → vz′(π) and → is order-reversing in the 
first coordinate and order-preserving in the second one, it is enough to show that for every (α, z′) ∈ ZPX ,
gz(π) ≤ (vz′(π) → α) → ((gz(π) → vz′(π)) → α).
By residuation, associativity and commutativity of ⊗, the inequality above is equivalent to
[gz(π) ⊗ (gz(π) → vz′(π))] ⊗ (vz′(π) → α) ≤ α,
which is a tautology in residuated lattices.
To show that πS(z) ≤ gz(π), it is enough to find some (α, z′) ∈ ZPX such that
(uz′(π) → α) → (EP (z, z′) → α) ≤ gz(π). (9)
Let α := gz(π) and let z′ := (g, vπ ) such that g : SD → A maps  to 1 and every other element of SD to 0, and 




0 if σ ′ 
 ⊥
gz(π) if σ ′ ⊥ and σ ′ 
 π
1 if σ ′ π.
By definition and since gz is order-preserving and proper, EP (z, z′) = ∧σ ′∈SD[gz(σ ′) → vπ(σ ′)] =∧
σ ′
π [gz(σ ′) → gz(ψ)] = 1. Hence, (9) can be rewritten as follows:
(gz(π) → gz(π)) → gz(π) ≤ gz(ϕ),
which is true since gz(π) → gz(π) = 1 and 1 → gz(π) = gz(π). The case in which π := ♦σ is analogous to 
the one above, and its proof is omitted. 
Theorem A.8. The basic multi-type normal LMT-logic L is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of graph-based A-
frames.
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 ψ that is not derivable in L. Consider the proper filter fϕ and 
complement of proper ideal uψ given by
fϕ(χ) =
{
1 if ϕ 
 χ




0 if χ 
 ψ
1 if χ  ψ.
Then 
∧
χ (fϕ(χ) → uψ(χ)) = 1, for else there would have to be a formula χ0 such that fϕ(χ0) = 1 and uψ(χ0) = 0, 
which would mean that ϕ 
 χ0 and χ0 
 ψ and hence that ϕ 
 ψ , in contradiction with the assumption that ϕ 
 ψ
is not derivable. It follows that (fϕ, uψ) is a state (of the appropriate type) in the canonical model M. By the Truth 
Lemma, ϕ(z) = fϕ(ϕ) = 1, and moreover
([ψ])[0](z)
=∧(α,z′)∈ZX ([ψ])(α, z′) → (E(z, z′) → α)
≤([ψ])(0, z) → (E(z, z) → 0)
=(uψ(ψ) → 0) → (E(z, z) → 0)
=(0 → 0) → (1 → 0)
=0,
which proves the claim. 
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